

Regional Governance and the Post-Industrial Economy

Allan Wallis

*Two roads diverged in a woods, and I—
I took the one less traveled by
And that has made all the difference.
—Robert Frost*

In 1991 Denver lost out to Indianapolis in a competition to win construction of a \$250 million United Airlines maintenance facility. After a speech in Denver a year later, former Indianapolis Mayor Bill Hudnut was asked why Indianapolis had been successful even though Denver's incentive package was more generous. His answer was that in his city when negotiations took place with a major corporation, only three people had to be in the room: the corporate executive, the mayor, and someone from the governor's office. Because of Unigov—the consolidated city-county government—the mayor could speak for the region.¹

A story with similar implications is told by Clarke County (Georgia) commissioner Tal DuVall. Several times the county and its core city of Athens attempted to win voter approval of a consolidation plan. The primary rationale presented to the voters had always been economical service delivery and infrastructure development. Although analysis demonstrated that consolidation would achieve significant savings, the voters weren't buying.

But in 1992, a consolidation referendum passed. Success resulted from a change in strategy. Rather than using an argument based on service and infrastruc-

ture cost savings, commissioners justified consolidation this time as a way of improving economic competitiveness. DuVall said,

When you have a corporation that wants to locate, they want to know that you can provide the necessary permits and deliver the services they need. If you can't give them an answer quickly, then they start to look elsewhere. It's easier to provide a timely response when you're speaking as one government.²

Across the country communities are beginning to realize that economic competitiveness requires a regional approach. The real competition is not among communities of the same region, but among regions here and abroad. Even regions long divided by bitter rivalries among local governments are finding common cause in the threats of job and population loss. This shift in attitude is evident in places like the Mon Valley that previously comprised the heart of Pennsylvania's steel-producing region. The mills are now closed, and the thirty-seven local governments in the valley are having to learn to cooperate regionally in efforts to restore their economy (Ehrenhalt 1995).

The desire to achieve economic competitiveness has always been one of the basic reasons for strengthening regional government (Wallis 1994a). In the nineteenth-

century city, size was equated with economic strength. The rapid expansion of central cities to encompass their populated suburbs was justified as making the city more competitive. Size assured an adequate labor supply, as well as the capacity to deliver the services and infrastructure necessary to support industrial growth.

In today's economy, size does not necessarily result in strength. Instead, competitiveness comes from the ability to mobilize regional resources in response to rapidly changing demands. Most regions in the United States have not figured this out yet. Communities within the same region continue to compete with one another for economic base, and in cases where metropolitan communities do unite, it is often against the central city, which is seen as a common enemy. This internal competitiveness assumes that the United States maintains economic hegemony among nations. By contrast, regions in other advanced industrialized nations are reorganizing to become effective competitors in a global economy. They realize that in such an economy national policy may be less important than effective regional governance.

Characteristics of the Global Economy

In a mass-production economy, wealth is made by transforming raw materials into consumer products—for example, coke and iron into steel and steel into automobiles. The process is labor- and resource-intensive. In a post-industrial economy, wealth is generated by the exchange of information and the transformation of ideas (Reich 1991). Microsoft has become one of the wealthiest corporations in the world by manufacturing information-organizing products for a market that did not exist twenty years ago. U.S. communities may compete for a Japanese automobile assembly plant, but the real

wealth of the parent corporation is generated by its design, engineering, and marketing side, which it is not likely to ship overseas.

A post-industrial *global* economy is characterized by three interrelated trends (Accordino 1992):

- **Globalization of Production.** In a mass-production economy, manufacturing is concentrated in metropolitan regions, especially in central cities. But in a post-industrial economy, routine production activities are transferred to rural areas and/or less developed countries. Such relocation is motivated by the search for lower labor and land costs in a politically stable environment. It is made possible by such technological changes as wide-body cargo jets, which reduce transportation costs, especially for valuable electronic goods, and by electronic communications, which allow a high level of production control from remote headquarters.
- **Globalization of Consumption.** In a mass-production economy, efficiency requires a market that demands large quantities of a standard product. If the market can be controlled by a few major manufacturers, they can regulate the product obsolescence cycle to assure profits. In a post-industrial economy, the product obsolescence cycle is accelerated as consumers in advanced industrial nations seek newer products from an ever broadening range of suppliers. Shorter product obsolescence cycles place pressure on manufacturing to become more flexible and market responsive, while remaining cost competitive. Lowering or eliminating tariff barriers also served to promote a global flow of products.
- **Globalization of Investment.** In today's economy, capital is increasingly free to move around the world, seeking the

highest return. This mobility has significantly increased with the free-floating exchange rate system that was initiated in the early 1970s. Moreover, participation in global capital markets is no longer restricted to large-scale investors. Today, anyone with an interest can become involved.

Globalization of the economy has been occurring for several decades, but the end of the Cold War, combined with a lowering of international trade barriers, has accelerated the pace. A recent study sponsored by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (1992, 6) concludes, "As national trade barriers are lowered... 'city-regions' in the European Community and the North American Free Trade Area are [becoming] the real arenas of global economic competition...." Similarly, urbanologists Richard Knight and Gary Gappert (1989, 11-12), writing about city-regions, observe,

With the advent of the global economy, nation building is becoming more and more synonymous with city building. Cities serve as the nexus of the global society. As the global society expands, a nation's welfare will be determined increasingly by the roles its cities play in the global society.

Effects on the Structure of Regions

The global shifts just described have produced a significant restructuring of what economic geographers refer to as the "system of cities" that consists of the patterns of production and labor dependencies among metropolitan centers (Bourne and Simmons 1978). A mass-production economy results in a system characterized by dominant central cities and, in later phases, polycentric regions. By contrast, because a post-industrial economy depends more on the flow of information than on the movement of material goods, the system of cities it produces is less dependent on spatial

proximity (Castells 1984). Consequently, the vitality of suburban and "edge-city" employment centers has become less dependent on the health of the central city, or cities, in their region. Instead, they may depend on the vitality of corporations located in wholly different regions.

One manifestation of changing employment locations is that incomes for central-city residents, which historically have been higher than those of suburban households, today are significantly lower and declining (Rusk 1993; Barnes and Ledebur 1994). Another manifestation is that an increase in vehicle miles traveled in urban areas is now primarily generated by intra-suburban trips rather than in commutes between central cities and suburbs (Federal Highway Administration 1990).

The transformation of the system of cities is also evident in the restructuring of labor markets within regions. In the mass-production era, metropolitan regions with an economic base of heavy industry supported a high proportion of blue-collar employment. Workers in this segment—often benefiting from organized-labor negotiated wage agreements—could expect to achieve relatively high salaries that outpace inflation. By contrast, the service-based economy of a post-industrial era consists of significantly fewer blue-collar workers on one end and a growing number of highly skilled service professionals and semiprofessionals at the other. This labor market reflects a dual economy in which employees in the low-skilled segment have little opportunity to earn wages comparable to those in the skilled segment (Noyelle and Stanback 1981).

The loss of middle-income jobs in both manufacturing and services has produced a widening gulf between classes, with fewer bridges of opportunity. It has also produced a socially isolated "underclass" with extremely poor access to new job markets (Kasarda 1989). Again, in socio-spatial

terms, this earnings gap manifests itself in the form of suburban alienation from the central city.

These changes often are used to question the central city's significance in the region's economy. But that debate draws attention away from a more fundamental point—the importance of the interdependency of all of a region's communities for its economic competitiveness. The implication of the foregoing analysis is not that a post-industrial economy allows all communities to function as free agents, independent and indifferent to their neighbors. Rather, it suggests that the communities of a region are now bound up in a far more complex set of interdependencies, and the relationship between central cities and their suburbs is only one aspect (Savitch 1992).

Pathways through the Post-Industrial Economy

Over the last twenty years, regions across the country have been struggling to keep pace with the trends associated with globalization of the economy. Some regions, faced with factory closings, offer extremely attractive incentives to keep existing manufacturing plants and lure new ones. Others have abandoned efforts to maintain their old industrial base and seek either to attract or incubate firms capable of competing in the new high-tech service sector (Miller and Cotes 1987). Some approaches clearly are predicated on a desire to restore the old economic order, while others attempt to comprehend emerging trends and apply them in their plans. Major corporations similarly are engaged in prognostications on how best to restructure.

How a region chooses to respond to the changing economic realities reshaping it depends very much on how current trends are interpreted and future directions are perceived. At this point in its evolution, the

post-industrial economy appears to have at least two distinct pathways through it. Each has very different implications for the competitive mobilization of regions and, in turn, for their governance.

The Neo-Fordist Path

Many of the largest corporations in the United States continue to adhere to mass-production, or "Fordist," principles. These corporations are attempting to extrapolate those principles on a global scale by promoting an international division of labor on one hand and an international organization of markets on the other. This is especially evident among automobile manufacturers (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994). Such corporations continue to be structured hierarchically, with a strong division between upper-management decision makers and line production workers. Neither trust nor power flows downward through their organizational structure.

Variants of the neo-Fordist approach, however, accept a degree of decentralization. In some cases, individual factories or firms are encouraged to diversify. More power is given to the worker on the line, especially where total quality management principles have been adopted.

Large firms also create smaller subsidiaries focusing on specialized production and innovation. For example, major steel manufacturers have created or acquired subsidiaries that produce relatively small batches of special alloy steels. These mills often are built in new locations, rather than replacing older mills that have been closed due to technological obsolescence and changing demands. Likewise, chemical companies have subsidiaries specializing in products ranging from new fibers to insecticides (Sabel 1982; Bianchi 1992).

Some analysts suggest that the neo-Fordist approach contains inherent contradictions. Its attempts to achieve greater

flexibility to respond to rapidly changing consumer demands require a redistribution of power and responsibilities that is antithetical to the corporate hierarchies that continue to concentrate control (Sabel 1982; Lorenz 1992).

The Regional Industrial-Districts Path

In the early phases of the industrial revolution, efficient production occurred in districts where skilled artisans learned to employ machines to increase their output of traditional goods. Some shops produced only components of a finished good—fabric but not cloth, cloth but not clothing—but the district as a whole created market-competitive products. Such districts maintained a high level of craft, but they also provided an environment conducive to continuous, if relatively modest, innovation. In addition to a shared ethic for quality craftsmanship, such districts cultivated strong social solidarity. Indeed, analysts of such districts emphasize the importance of trust and reciprocity in structuring social relations (Sabel 1982; Lorenz 1992).

The manufacturing districts of early industrialization were largely displaced by mass-production techniques that sought to reduce reliance on craftsmanship by dividing production tasks into small steps that could be reproduced, without variation, by machines. But the idea of industrial districts never wholly disappeared. The production of highly specialized goods, especially those sufficiently high priced to cover rising labor costs (e.g., musical instruments), continues in a district form of organization. In some cases, districts have developed a symbiotic relationship with mass producers. The fashion industry, for example, still relies on highly specialized districts to create new designs that subsequently provide the basis for mass-produced imitations.

In addition to traditional industrial districts such as those associated with the garment industry, new high-tech districts have grown in prominence since the end of World War II. The Draper Labs of MIT helped provide the knowledge base for many of the firms that now dot Route 208 west of Boston. Similarly, Stanford University helped give rise to Silicon Valley. These high-tech districts have several characteristics of their traditional counterparts. They, too, rely on shared craft knowledge that can best, and perhaps only, be gained by being immersed in the environment of production—an environment that typically includes proximity to major research universities (Miller and Cotes 1987).

The vitality of both traditional and high-tech districts relies on orderly competition among local firms, but this internal competition limits itself to maintaining and enhancing competitive advantage over similar districts located elsewhere. Both types of districts develop strong reciprocal relationships among firms—relationships built on trust and mutual advantage.

Implications for the Governance of Regions

Each path through the post-industrial economy has significant implications for the definition and conduct of governance, especially at the regional and even at the neighborhood level.

Governance Supporting the Neo-Fordist Path

Under a neo-Fordist regime, large firms become even larger through mergers and acquisitions and more global in their expanse. In effect, they operate in a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1990). As such, it might be expected that they would want an end to all government regulation of trade. In fact, they lobby for streamlining and/or eliminating

certain forms of regulation that are costly to large corporations, such as those pertaining to environmental protection, workplace safety, and minimum wage and benefit levels. Nevertheless, such firms continue to support national policies offering specific market protections, production subsidies, funding for research and development, and advantageous tax policies.

Since neo-Fordist firms benefit from the flexibility to relocate where labor-market conditions are most favorable, they presumably support federal policies that are non-place specific—for example, policies that favor accelerated obsolescence of capital investment in factories. Conversely, they oppose funding that is directed toward the problems of declining cities or regions.

At the state, regional, and local levels, governments respond to conditions of neo-Fordist competition by offering generous incentives to attract new industry. Regional cooperation often is required to put together an adequate package of incentives, and the communities of a region often must lobby collectively to secure sufficient state support. The resulting bidding wars among regions is advantageous to locating corporations but not always advantageous to the regions.

In many cases, winning a bid for a new industry can result in downstream losses. The public sector may be left with debts from up-front incentives if companies move out within the payback period (Faux 1987). States have tried to protect themselves by implementing “clawback” provisions, requiring corporations to pay back incentives if they relocate before a specified period (Ledebur and Woodward 1990). But if such policies have real talons, they can act as disincentives to locating in those states. Alternatively, some neighboring regions and states have agreements not to compete to avoid bidding wars, but these agreements have proven to be conspicuously nonbind-

ing when a large relocation prospect is highly prized. In short, although competition for jobs can result in increased inter-governmental cooperation, especially at the regional level, it is just as likely to result in predatory competition.

Even when public-sector cooperation is achieved, the private sector may maintain a tenant-at-will mentality, failing to commit itself to the region's long-range future. If firms are not committed to being regional citizens, neither are their executives. Local nonprofit institutions have long been dependent on the involvement of such executives to raise funds and lend expertise. But executives in neo-Fordist corporations are more likely to identify with their firm's worldwide network, rather than the local social networks of the communities in which they are located. When the Rockefellers left Cleveland they still felt a strong civic obligation to the community, leaving it with a significant endowment. Will British Petroleum feel a similar obligation?

All this is not to suggest that corporations are totally footloose. Many have significant plant investments, as well as concentrations of skilled employees, at specific locations. Consequently, they continue to have a strong vested interest in the ability of local and regional governments to deliver essential public services and infrastructure in an efficient and timely manner. One potential implication for governance growing out of this demand is increased use of single-purpose regional authorities, for example, port and/or airport authorities, water districts, sewage districts, and the like. Such authorities overcome local fragmentation, and corporations can work with them easily.

However, many corporate requirements are not amenable to such an approach. For example, providing an adequate supply of affordable housing so that skilled employees can be attracted to and retained in an

area often involves working with local governments on reform of their land-use policies. In this case, corporate interests may promote regional governance designed to override local controls that limit the supply of needed goods and services (Association of Bay Area Governments et al. 1990; Danielson and Doig 1982).

Similarly, corporations may find it necessary to become involved in issues of public education to assure an adequately trained workforce. Again, promoting regional governance to address the problem may be more attractive to corporate interests since it provides an organized forum through which to influence performance. By contrast, social equity issues, such as concentrated poverty and fiscal disparities among communities of a region, are not likely to be issues of central concern to neo-Fordist corporations (Mollenkopf and Castells 1991). The collective implication for regions is a somewhat strengthened form of governance, but in areas of narrow and strategic corporate interest.

Governance Supporting the Industrial-Districts Path

In contrast to the neo-Fordist path, which focuses attention on federal policies that can promote mobility, the industrial-districts path is much more concerned with developing effective regional and local policies. Likewise, whereas the neo-Fordist path prefers policies that are not place-specific, the industrial-districts path is firmly rooted to place and emphasizes building local capacity.

Nevertheless, advocates of an industrial-districts path see a strong role for federal policy if it is structured to support and enhance local and regional efforts at strengthening the industrial-districts approach (Accordino 1992). Developing a national industrial policy could have this effect, depending on how it is crafted. Likewise, a

federal enterprise zone program could be structured to support industrial districts. Unfortunately, the current empowerment zone/enterprise community program, although emphasizing the importance of community capacity building, does not embrace an industrial-districts philosophy.

Since the industrial-districts approach emphasizes development of local production networks, advocates of this position see benefit in creating a regional government capable of providing a wide variety of public goods ranging from training and education to support for research and development, medical care, and housing (Lorenz 1992; Clavel 1986).

Economists Piore and Sabel (1984, 301) conclude,

Successful industrial reorganization in the United States will require reinvigoration of local and regional government—not necessarily its supersession in favor of an expansion of corporate autonomy. Industrial policy will have to be regional policy: to be effective, the coordination of training programs, industrial research, transportation networks, credit, marketing information, environmental protection, and other elements of infrastructure will have to be done at the regional level.

In addition to suggesting a strong role for regional governments, the industrial-district paradigm also suggests a restructuring of *governance*, defined as participation in the processes of public decision making. In this conception, governance involves considerable interaction between the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. This restructuring goes beyond the creation of partnerships, focusing more broadly on achieving genuine collaborations in which all sectors—public, private, and nonprofit—provide distinct services and capacities in pursuit of a common regional vision (Wallis 1994b).

The type of governance advocated to support industrial districts also emphasizes neighborhood/community participation in

decision-making processes (Peirce et al. 1993). Interest in neighborhood-level governance is indicative of the place-based orientation of an industrial-district approach, as distinct from the "borderless world" of the neo-Fordist alternative.

Emphasis on cross-sectorial governance also recognizes the importance of strengthening local civic infrastructure as an integral aspect of economic development. Robert Putnam (1993a, 106), drawing from his research on regions in Italy, observes,

Of two equally poor Italian regions a century ago, both very backward, but one with more civic engagement, and the other with a hierarchical structure, the one with more choral societies and soccer clubs has grown steadily wealthier. The more civic region has prospered because trust and reciprocity were woven into its social fabric ages ago.

Part of the effort to strengthen civic infrastructure involves reengaging the poor living in isolated neighborhoods, as well as tapping into the talents available from new immigrants. The justification for placing resources in these populations of a region is that they represent human capital, which if abandoned creates inertia to competitive development.

Comparing the Paths

The two paths through a post-industrial economy, which are briefly described here, are ideal types. Most U.S. regions are of a scale and complexity that elements of both types are evident, but neither exists in a pure form. Nevertheless, distinguishing between these two paths may help regions in thinking about their current economic structure, how it is changing, and where it might be heading.

As suggested in the comparisons summarized on the next page, each path through the post-industrial economy has very different implications for regional government and governance. The neo-Fordist

alternative, based on the growing dominance of large multinational corporations, requires regions with the capacity to deliver necessary infrastructure and services. This demand could be met by developing and/or strengthening special regional authorities or by enhancing the capacity of existing organizations, such as metropolitan planning organizations and councils of government.

In many regions, a neo-Fordist alternative also would benefit from strengthening regional capacity to override local government opposition to siting various supportive land uses, ranging from power plants to landfills to affordable housing. None of these requirements necessitate a radical reinvention of regional government or governance, but all involve a degree of state and interlocal commitment that to date has been very difficult to achieve.

By contrast, the industrial-districts scenario implies a substantial restructuring of regional government and governance. Few if any U.S. regions have developed an effective means to analyze adequately the linkages of industries comprising their current or nascent industrial districts, and few have the ability to connect such analysis to the formulation of a complementary, strategic policy agenda.

If the emerging global economy favors industrial districts, then U.S. economic competitiveness will be substantially disadvantaged by its lack of governance capacity to support such development. European and non-western regions appear to be ahead of the game in this respect, not simply due to recent efforts at "harmonization," a term for reducing local government fragmentation (van den Berg et al. 1993), but because of well established political cultures in many regions that already support the types of governance conducive to industrial districts (Lorenz 1992; Putnam 1993b; Sabel 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984).

Implications for Governance

Neo-Fordist Path

Industrial-Districts Path

Federal Policy

The neo-Fordist path favors national policies that lower trade barriers and reduce regulation, except on selected issues where protection is beneficial.

Industrial-districts proponents favor national industrial policies that emphasize innovation, and they favor enterprise zone policies that focus on employment rather than facilities.

Relationship between Sectors

In general, neo-Fordist behaviors reinforce the distinction between public and private sectors. Consequently, governance in the public interest remains the charge of government in the conventional sense.

Industrial-districts behaviors support partnership arrangements and cross-sectorial collaboration and emphasize *governance* as opposed to government in the traditional sense.

Interest in Place and Civic Involvement

Neo-Fordists operate in a borderless world, favoring policies that promote greater flexibility of location. They are less inclined to become involved regional citizens, and this reduces the overall civic strength of the community.

Industrial-districts supporters favor place-based policies, such as those to enhance the existing work force, instead of policies that promote mobility. Strong civic involvement is essential for developing appropriate regional economic capacity.

Regional Governance

Neo-Fordists benefit from regions' predatory competition to attract new firms and from regional cooperation that is designed to put together an attractive location package.

Proponents of the industrial-districts path want to incubate new industry.

They favor the use of regional authorities to remedy local fragmentation and assure required infrastructure and services are provided. Authorities can be more responsive to corporate demands because they typically operate with less public scrutiny.

They want to eliminate fragmentation and achieve greater efficiency, as long as accountability is not lost.

They promote stronger regional governance as a way to provide an organized forum to use to overcome more general obstacles to economic competitiveness, such as the supply of affordable housing and a trained workforce.

They promote strong general regional governance in which all sectors have an active voice. Issues of social inequity should be addressed while achieving full human-capital development.

Which Path?

Global restructuring of the economy is no longer an esoteric phenomenon confined to specialized conferences and journals. It has become material for the evening news. Increased awareness of change can motivate desire for shared dialogue and eventually for collective action.

Asking the question "Which path?" assumes a deliberative process by which interest groups in a region get together and think about what is happening to their economic structure and what they need to do to change it. In some cases this does occur, but only rarely. There are many efforts at visioning, but few engage in the kind of rigorous

economic analysis necessary to generate informed conclusions. Several regions have developed coalitions of corporate interests dedicated to developing strategies to enhance regional economic competitiveness.³ Some of these coalitions even include public agency members, but more often community dialogue occurs in an environment of crisis defined by the threat of a factory or military base closing.

If the question "Which path?" is to be asked, several things have to happen:

- **Identity.** If interests from different sectors within a region are to enter into dialogue, they must first identify themselves as active participants in the life of their region.
- **Citizenship.** People not only need to see themselves as part of a region, they need to develop a sense of citizenship for its well being (Cisneros 1995).
- **Dialogue.** Once identity is established, opportunities must be provided for genuine dialogue. Coming together in dialogue helps reinforce identity with the region.
- **Vision.** Beyond dialogue, visioning involves a structured attempt to think about the future. It works best when it is strategic (about specific, pressing issues) rather than general (Dodge 1992).
- **Mobilization.** If visioning is effective, it should lead to mobilization to implement elements of the vision.

Realistically, regions do not have the capacity to control global economic forces, but they can actively decide how they want to respond to them. In formulating their responses, alternative forms of regional governance should be a central consideration. ☀

Notes

¹ William Hudnut, keynote speech at Town Meeting West (Denver, Colorado), April 3, 1992.

² Personal interview with Commissioner DuVall, April 21, 1993.

³ Examples of such coalitions include Cleveland Tomorrow, Greater Philadelphia First, and the Greater Seattle Trade and Development Alliance.

References

- Accordino, John. 1992. *The United States in the Global Economy*. Chicago: American Library Association.
- Association of Bay Area Governments et al. 1990. *Bay Area Housing*. The Local Housing Element Assistance Project.
- Barnes, William, and Larry Ledebur. 1990. *Toward a New Political Economy of Metropolitan Regions*. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.
- . 1994. *Local Economies: The U.S. Common Market of Local Economic Regions*. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.
- Barnet, Richard, and John Cavanagh. 1994. *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Bianchi, Patrizio. 1992. Levels of Policy and the Nature of Post-Fordist Competition. In *Pathways to Industrial and Regional Development*, edited by Micheal Stroper and Allen J. Scott. New York: Routledge.
- Bourne, Larry S., and James W. Simmons, eds. 1978. *System of Cities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castells, Manuel. 1984. Space and Society. In *Cities in Transformation: Class, Capital and the State*, edited by Michael Smith. Vol. 28, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews.
- Cisneros, Henry. 1995. *Regionalism: The New Geography of Opportunity*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- Clavel, Pierre. 1986. *The Progressive City*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Danielson, Micheal N., and Jameson W. Doig. 1982. *New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dodge, William R. 1992. Strategic Intercommunity Governance Networks. *National Civic Review* (Fall–Winter).
- Ehrenhalt, Alan. 1995. Cooperate or Die. *Governing* (September): 28–32.
- Faux, Jeff. 1987. Industrial Policy and Democratic Institutions. In *The State and Local*

- Industrial Policy Question*, edited by Harvey Goldstein. Chicago: American Planning Association.
- Federal Highway Administration. 1990. *Personal Travel in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.
- German Marshall Fund of the United States. 1992. "Divided Cities in the Global Economy" (November).
- Hanson, Royce, ed. 1983. *Rethinking Urban Policy: Urban Development in an Advanced Economy*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1994. Collaborative Advantage. *Harvard Business Review* (July-August): 96-108.
- Kasarda, John. 1989. Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, v. 501.
- Knight, Richard V., and Gary Gappert. 1989. *Cities in the Global Society*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Ledebur, Larry, and Douglas Woodward. 1990. Adding a Stick to the Carrot: Location Incentives with Clawbacks, Rescissions and Calibrations. *Economic Development Quarterly* 4(3): 221-237.
- Lorenz, Edward H. 1992. Trust, Community and Cooperation: Toward a Theory of Industrial Districts. In *Pathways to Industrial and Regional Development*, edited by Micheal Stroper and Allen J. Scott. New York: Routledge.
- Miller, Roger, and Marcel Cotes. 1987. *Growing the Next Silicon Valley: A Guide for Successful Regional Planning*. Lexington, MA: Heath and Company.
- Mollenkopf, John, and Manuel Castells. 1991. *Dual City: Restructuring New York*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Noyelle, Thierry J. 1983. The Implications of Industry Restructuring for Spatial Organization in the United States. In *Regional Analysis and the New International Division of Labor*, edited by Frank Moulaert and Patricia W. Salinas. Boston: Kluwer/Nijkoff Publishing.
- and Thomas Stanback, Jr. 1981. *The Economic Transformation of American Cities*. New York: Conservation of Human Resources, Columbia University.
- Ohmae, Kenichi. 1990. *Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Peirce, Neal, Curtis Johnson, and John Stuart Hall. 1993. *Citistates: How Urban America Can Prosper in a Competitive World*. Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press.
- Piore, Michael J., and Charles F. Sabel. 1984. *The Second Industrial Divide*. New York: Basic Books.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993a. What Makes Democracy Work. *National Civic Review* (Spring): 101-107.
- . 1993b. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reich, Robert. 1991. *The Work of Nations*. New York: Random House.
- Rusk, David. 1993. *Cities without Suburbs*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.
- Sabel, Charles. 1982. *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Savitch, Hank. 1992. Ties That Bind. *National Civic Review* (Summer-Fall).
- Van den Berg, Leo, H. Van Klink, and J. Van Der Meer. 1993. *Governing Metropolitan Regions*. Brookfield: Avebury.
- Wallis, Allan. 1994a. Regionalism: The First Two Waves. *National Civic Review* (Spring).
- . 1994b. Inventing Regionalism: A Two-Phase Approach. *National Civic Review* (Fall-Winter).

Allan Wallis serves as director of research for the National Civic League and has been involved with research on metropolitan regionalism for the last six years. That research began with an evaluation of implementing statewide growth-management requirements in Florida and continued with research on growth-management practices in other states that place significant responsibilities at the metropolitan regional level including California, Oregon, Washington, and Georgia. Mr. Wallis has published a monograph on Florida growth management, as well as five articles on regional governance. He also is involved in research on improving collaboration among providers of human services.